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RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION

THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION:
A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF JURISPRUDENCE
By ELMER E. SmEAD*
bias against retroactive laws is an ancient one. That the
Greeks were influenced by it is shown by the case of Timokrates and the Athenian Ambassadors.- There the Ambassadors
had withheld money owed to the city-state, and were condemned
to repay twice the amount. Timokrates succeeded in securing the
enactment of a law to relieve the Ambassadors of this penalty,
but, as a consequence of the efforts of Demosthenes, the law was
held to be invalid because it was retroactive. 2 From this case
Sir Paul Vinogradoff has drawn the conclusion that the Greeks
recognized the principle expressing opposition to retroactive laws
which is a very important element in American law today.
It is clear, furthermore, that the Roman Law included the
same principle, as shown in several prohibitions laid down by the
Corpus Juris Civilis. The Digest gives as a rule that the law-giver
could not change his course of action to the injury of another person. "Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius iniuriam."S
The principle, however, was more dearly stated by the Code,
which declared that laws and customs should be given an operation on future transactions and that they cannot be recalled to past
facts unless it is stated expressly that they apply either to past
time or to pending transactions.
"Leges et consuetutiones futuris certum est dare formnam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim etiam de
praeterito tempore adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum six."'
T

HE

*Instructor in Political Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
12 Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence 139, 140. It is
interesting to note here that the author uses the term ex post facto legislation in the general sense rather than in the limited meaning of criminal
retroactive laws given to it in the United States constitution. See footnote
51. His statement that the principle is "dearly stated in the constitution of
the United States of America that no law should be retroactive, that no
person ought to be affected by a law which wvas not in force when his
case 2was decided" is inaccurate, as will be shown.
1t is worthy of note that the statute here was to the advantage of
the defendants, whereas the principle as applied in Anglo-American law
was united with the concept of justice-which restricted the application of
the principle to those cases where the retroactive application of the Act
disadvantageously to a party to a case.
worked
3

Corpus Juris Civilis, Digest, 50, 17, 75. The "nemo" here refers to the

lawgiver.
4

Corpus Juris Civilis, Code, 1, 14, 7.
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This was the rule which the English common law courts later declared applicable as a guide to the construction of statutes. In so far
as the principle found its way into the law of the United States,
it took the same form as a rule for construction of statutes, but
when united with the doctrine of vested rights it was identified
with the natural law and found its way into the system of constitutional limitations on governmental power. It is primarily this
latter development which this paper purports to trace and analyze.
This principle of the Roman Law found its way into the English
common law through the medium of Bracton. As is well known,
he served to carry over into the common law a considerable number of the principles of the civil law in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae-a work which was well known to English
students of the common law in the Sixteenth and Seventeeth centuries. One of these principles was that expressed in the condemnation of retroactive legislation. Thus, in 1250 Bracton declared:
"Item tempus spectandum erit, cum omnis nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debeat et non praeteritis."''
The similarity, both as to language and principle, to be found in
the statements of the Roman Law and of Bracton gives support
to the conclusion that to him must be given the credit for providing this principle with its start in the common law of England.
It was Coke, however, who gave the principle currency and acceptability. He did this in the same way in which he had established for posterity other principles of the common law-by the
creation of a legal maxim which, under the prevailing philosophy
of the period, placed upon that principle for which a maxim was
coined the stamp of authority and irrefutability. The principle
under discussion seemed to Coke to be a rule so obviously just as
to be beyond criticism.6 In making it a maxim of the common law
he established it for all time, and its development as a part of
present day jurisprudence begins with his writings. A profound
student of the law, he knew Bracton's work well and found therein
the principle already stated. Consequently, it can be said that
Coke lifted the principle from Bracton and applied it to the interpretation of the statute of Gloucester, saying that that Act ap5

Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae b. 4, c. 38, f. 228:
edition by Sir Travers Twiss, III, 530. The translation by Twiss (p. 531)
is: "Likewise time is to be taken into account, since every new constitution
ought6 to impose a form upon future matters, and not upon things past."
See Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the
State Police Power, (1936)

21 Cornell L. Q. 276.
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plied only prospectively "for it is a rule and law of Parliament,
that Regularly Nova constitutio futuris formam iiponere debet
'
non praeteritis."?
Coke usually is cited as the authority for this
principle as represented by this maxim of the common law, and
the courts seem to have become acquainted with it primarily
through his works.
Once the principle was thus established it was adopted by the
English courts and commentators. It indicated the attitude which
the courts would take toward any statute. That attitude was
one of opposition to construing a statute so as to make it apply
to cases arising prior to the enactment of the statute or to acts
from a time anterior to passage. The principle expressing this
opposition was united with the concept of justice in such a way
that it became a basic part of that concept, and a violation of the
principle was thought to work an injustice. This is particularly
evidenced by the fact that the principle was, in practice, invoked
only in those cases where the retroactive operation of a statute resulted disadvantageously to a party. Thus Coke 8 declared that no
Act of Parliament should be construed in such a way as to do a
man any damage when he was free from wrong. Also, he maintained that one was punished or injured if he were affected disadvantageously by the retroactive application of a law.
Furthermore, this concept of justice, of which the maxim was
thought to be an element, was united with the theory of the nature
of law. An essential character of laws was held to be applicability only in the future. Thus, in the thought of that period on
the nature of justice and the characteristics of law, these were combined and interwoven with a resulting strengthening of the fundamental nature of the principle itself. This is illustrated very well
by Blackstone. He pointed out that all laws should be made to
operate in futuro because it is reasonable that they be prescribed
or promulgated and there can be no promulgation .where they commence at a time anterior to enactment. In support of his view of
the necessity and reasonableness of promulgation, he declared that
as a matter of justice laws should not be enforced before the subjects have an opportunity to become acquainted with them.9
Although it was true that the common law accepted this maxim
72
8 Inst. 292. See also Littl., sec. 685; Co. Littl. 360a.
See footnote 7. See also cases cited in footnote 9 and 10, and Chappell
v. Purday (1843) 12 M. & W. 303; Stead v. Carey, (1845) 1 C. B. 496.
14 L. J. C. P. 177, 5 L. T. 0. S. 74, 9 Jur. 511; The Midland Ry. v.Pye,
(1861) 10 C. B. N. S. 179, 30 L. J. C. P. 314, 4 L. T. 510, 9 W. R. 658.
91 Blackstone, Comm. 46.
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as the statement of a principle of justice which was irrefutable and
beyond criticism, yet it was not applied as a rule of limitation
on the power of the legislature. The courts and commentators
viewed it as a rule to guide the courts, but that Parliament, if it
desired, could pass a statute to apply to a past time was always
clear. The Digest showed that the Prince could make a law
operate retrospectively if he made it expressly clear that such was
his will, and the common law followed this interpretation of the
rule. Thus, this principle in the English common law meant that
the courts, in the exercise of their function of interpreting the
law in the cases which came before them, viewed themselves
as bound by the rule of construction that no law should be given
an operation from a time prior to its enactment unless Parliament
had expressly provided that it should have such an effect10 or
unless the words of the Act could have no meaning except by application to this past time." Because a retroactive law was unjust
the judges insisted that they would not assume that Parliament
meant a statute in general terms to be applied retrospectively.
As a rule of construction some of the outstanding applications
of the maxim by the English courts have been to the Statute of
Frauds and Perjuries, 12 the Statute of Mortmain,13 and to bankruptcy laws. 14 Also, in criminal laws it was thought to be unjust
10 Gillmore v. Shooter, (1678) 2 Mod. Rep. 310, 2 Lev. 227, 2 Show. 16,
1 Freem. K. B. 466, T. Jones 108, 1 Vent. 330; Wilkinson v. Meyer, (1723)
2 Ld. Raym. 1350, 1352, 8 Mod. Rep. 173; Couch, qui tam v. Jeffries,

(1769) 4 Burr. 2460, 2463.

Towler v. Chatterton, (1829)

6 Bing. 258, 264, L. & Welsh. 74, 3

Moo. & P. 619, 8 L. J. 0. S. C. P. 30; Paddon v. Bartlett, (1835) 3 Ad. &

El. 884.
Hitchcock v. Way, (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 943, 951, 2 Nev. & P. K. B. 72.
6 L. J. B. 215; Moon v. Durden, (1848) 2 Exch. 22, 12 Jur. 138; Marsh v.
Higgins, (1850) 9 C. B. 551, 567, 568, 1 L. M. & P. 253, 19 L. J. C. P. 297;
Attorney General v. Bristol Waterworks Co., (1855) 10 Exch. 884, 3 C. L.
R. 726, 24 L. J. Ex. 205, 24 L. T. U. S. 311; The Ironsides, (1862) 1 Lush.
458, 465, 31 L. J. P. M. & A. 129, 6 L. T. 59, 1 Mar. L. C. 200. But see
Burn v. Cavalho, (1834) 1 Ad. & El. 883, 895, 896.

See also I Blackstone, Comm. 46; Bacon, Abridgment, Statute (c) 4, 6;
Herbert Broom, Legal Maxims 14, 15.

"12 Blackstone, Comm. 46.
1 Gillmore v. Shooter, (1678) 2 Mod. 310, 2 Lev. 227, 2 Show. 16,
1 Freem.
466, T. Jones 108, 1 Vent. 330.
' 3 Ashburnham v. Bradshaw, (1740) 2 Atk. 36, West. temp. Hard. 505,
Barn. Ch. 6, 7 Mod. Rep. 239. See also Attorney General v. Lloyd, (1747)
3 Atk. 551, 1 Ves. Sen. 32; Attorney General v. Andrews, (1748) 1 Ves.
Sen. 225; Willet v. Sanford, (1748) 1 Ves. Sen. 186; Attorney General v.
Bradley, (1760) 1 Eden 482; Attorney General v. Heartwell, (1764) Amb.
451, 2 Eden 234; Attorney General v. Downing, (1766) Amb. 550.
14See Young v. Rishworth, (1838) 8 Ad. & El. 470 where the court
said that the Act operated retrospectively. This was denied later by Lord
Denman, C. J., who held in Benjamin v. Belcher, (1840) 11 Ad. & El.
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to punish a man for an act which had not been a crime at the
time it had been committed 5 and one of Sir Francis Bacon's
Maxims 6 was designed largely to indicate this.
In the determination of the question of when a statute commences, however, there was at one time an actual denial of the
concept of justice with which the principle was identified in theory.
This is to be found in the doctrine of relation, whereby it was
held that an Act of Parliament did not take effect from the time of
passage or of Royal approval, but from the beginning of the
session in which it had been enacted. Where the act itself set
forth the date upon which it was to take effect, the practice of
relation back to the first day of the session was not followed."
Thus, by applying a fiction, the courts permitted that injustice
which they declared the principle against retroactive laws was
designed to prevent, because where an Act was passed during
the latter days of a session it could not have been known by
the public to be law during the early days of the same session.
Such a law was in fact applied to past acts from a time anterior
to enactment. An illustration of the violation of the precept of
justice upon which the principle was based and of the retroactive
effect of the application of the doctrine of relation is the case of
King v. Thurston"' in which a criminal law was held to have commenced on the first day of the session in which it had been enacted, with the result that the defendant was convicted of the crime
of murder where his act had not been murder at the time it had
been committed.
It appears, however, that the evils of the rule attracted the
attention of the Parliament, with the result that in 1793 a stat350, 3 Per. & Day. 317, 9 L. J. Q. B. 153, that the facts in the former case

show that the Act in that case was applied prospectively, and that the choice
of words by the court in that case was "unfortunate." See also Edmonds
v. Lawley, (1840) 6 M. & W. 285; Moore v. Phillips, (1841) 7 M. & W.

536; Waugh v. Middleton, (1853) 8 Exch. 352, 22 L. J. Ex. 109, 20

L. T. 0. S. 262.
15See text at footnote 9. See also Co. Litt., 360a; Couch, qui tam Y.
Jeffries, (1769) 4 Burr. 2460, 2462.
16Sir Francis Bacon, The Elements of the Common Lawes of England:
"Regula 8: Aestimatio praeteriti delicti ex post facto nunquam crescit."
"7Partridge v. Strange, (1553) 1 Plowd. 78. 79; Whitten, qui tam v.
Marine, (1554) Dyer 95a; Inglefield's Case, (1591) 1 And. 294: Sydowne
v. Holme, (1636) Cro. Car. 422, 424; King v. Thurston, (1674) 1 Lev. 91;
Henley v. Jones, (1678) 1 Sid. 310; Rex. v. Call, (1698) Comb. 413, 1 Ld.
Raym. 370; Panter v. Attorney General, (1772) 6 Bro. P. C. 486; Latless v.
Holmes, (1792) 4 T. R. 660. See also 4 Inst. 25; Comyn. Digest, Parliament
(R) 1; Viner, Abridgement, Statutes (B).
'sKing v. Thurston, (1674) 1 Lev. 91.
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ute of George 11119 provided that an Act should take effect on
the day it received the Royal assent unless some other time was
stated in the Act. The preamble to the statute declared that the
older rule was likely to produce a great injustice. By this action of
Parliament the principle was strengthened and its fundamental
nature emphasized. The Parliament itself recognized the element
of justice which was thought to be inherent in the principle and
determined that it should constitute a guide in the enactment of
sattutes. As shown above, Coke was probably the principal authority to view the principle as a natural law. He made of it a legal
maxim and called this maxim "a rule and law of Parliament." Thus
the change in grammar from the debeat of Bracton to the debet of
Coke is significant. Also, as shown above, only so far as the English judges and commentators following Coke identified this principle with the concept of justice, which in turn was viewed as an
element of the natural law, do we find any evidence that the principle itself might have been viewed as possessing the characteristics
of the "higher law." The English common law definitely recognized
the principle as one of its fundamental rules, but the doctrine of
legislative sovereignty was dominant throughout.
American law borrowed this principle and it soon became recognized as a rule of construction which our courts would follow in
interpreting statutes. 2 0 In this respect, the principle remained
as it had been in England prior to its transplantation to these
shores. American commentators and courts also viewed it as
based on the same concepts of justice and jurisprudence of which
the English common law held it to be an expression. Retroactive
laws were held to be oppressive and unjust, and it was maintained
that the essence of a law was that it be a rule for the future.2 1
The United States Supreme Court has stated expressly that retrospective legislation would not be favored, that such laws were contrary to American jurisprudence, and that the court, in the absence
of an express command or "necessary implication" to the contrary,
19(1793) 33 Geo. III, ch. 13.

20
There is an enormous number of cases in which the principle is held
to be one of construction. See the excellent collection in 59 C. J. 1159-1172.
See 21
also, Dash v. Van Kleeck, (1811) 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291.
See Calder v. Bell, (1798) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386, 388, 397, 1 L.Ed. 648;
Federalist, Number 44; 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 376, 378, 379; Ibid. III, 165; Dash v. Van Kleeck, (1811)
7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 502, 503, 506; 5 Am. Dec. 291; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Wheeler, (1814) 2 Gall. C. C.
105, 142; Bedford v. Shilling, (1818) 4 Searg. & Rawle (Pa.) 401, 8 Am.
Dec. 718; Cameron v. United States, (1914) 231 U. S. 710, 720, 34 Sup. Ct.
244, 58 L. Ed. 448; 1 Kent, Comm. 455, 456. See also notes 22 and 43.
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will presume that a law is designed to act prospectively.:2 American law never followed the common law practice of relation. The
rule always has been that a statute commences on the day of its
2
enactment when no other time is expressed.. 1
But this does not exhaust the usefulness to which the principle
was put by the American courts. They brought it to the defense
of vested rights by expanding its meaning and by incorporating
it into the system of limitations on legislative action, while at
the same time continuing to employ it as a rule of constructionl.
That the contribution should be one made, on the whole, by the
American courts is quite to be expected because of the absence of
the rule of legislative sovereignty and the presence of the institution of judicial review. These were essential to the development.
The identification of the principle with vested rights was
made by expanding the principle to make it include a prohibition
22

See United States v. The Peggy, (1801) 1 Cranch (U.S.) 103, 110,
2 L. Ed. 49; United States v. Heath, (1806) 3 Cranch (U.S.) 399, 2 L. Ed.
479; Reynolds v. M'Arthur, (1819) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 417, 434, 7 L. Ed. 470;
Wilkinson v. Leland, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 627, 657, 7 L. Ed. 542; Ladiga
v. Roland, (1844) 2 How. (U.S.) 581, 589, 11 L. Ed. 387; Murray v. Gibson,
(1853) 15 How. (U.S.) 421, 423, t4 L. Ed. 755; McEwen v. Den, (1861)
24 How. (U.S.) 242, 16 L. Ed. 672; Sohn v. Waterson, (1873) 17 Wall.

(U.S.) 596, 698 ff., 21 L. Ed. 737; United States v. Moore, (1877) 95
U. S. 760, 24 L. Ed. 588; Chew Heong v. United States, (1884) 112 U. S.
536, 557 f.f., 5 Sup. Ct. 291, 28 L. Ed. 816; Cook v. United States, (1891)
138 U. S. 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 268, 34 L. Ed. 906; United States v. Burr, (1895)
159 U. S. 78, 82, 83, 15 Sup. Ct. 1002, 40 L. Ed. 82; City Ry. Co. v. Citizens'
Street R. Co., (1897) 166 U. S. 557, 565, 17 Sup. Ct. 653, 41 L. Ed. 1114;
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, (1899), 174 U. S. 445, 477, 478, 19 Sup. Ct.
722, 43 L. Ed. 1041; McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel Co., (1902) 185 U. S.
505, 509, 22 Sup. Ct. 758, 46 L. Ed. 1012; White v. United States, (1903) 191
U. S. 545, 552, 24 Sup. Ct. 171, 48 L Ed. 295; United States v. American
Sugar Refining Co., (1906) 202 U. S. 563, 577, 26 Sup. Ct. 717, 50 L. Ed.
1149; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. United States, (1908),
209 U. S. 306, 314, 28 Sup. Ct. 537, 52 L. Ed. 804; Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Laramie Stockyards Co., (1913) 231 U. S. 190, 199, 34 Sup. Ct. 101, 58
L. Ed. 179; Billings v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 282. 34 Sup. Ct.
421, 58 L. Ed. 596; Waugh v. Board of Trustees, (1915) 237 U. S. 589.
595, 35 Sup. Ct. 720, 59 L. Ed. 1131; Aldecoa y Palet v. Hongkong and
Shanghai Baking Corp., (1918), 246 U. S. 621, 625, 38 Sup. Ct. 410, 62 L
Ed. 903; United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., (1918) 247 U. S. 310,
314, 38 Sup. Ct. 525, 62 L. Ed. 1130; Levy v. Wardell, (1922) 258 U. S.
542, 42 Sup. Ct. 395, 66 L. Ed. 758; Schwab v. Doyle, (1922), 258 U. S.
529, 534, 535, 42, Sup. Ct. 391, 66 L. Ed. 747; Fullerton-Krueger Lumber
Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (1925) 266 U. S. 435, 437, 45 Sup. Ct.
143, 69 L. Ed. 367; United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co., (1926)
270 U. S. 1, 3, 46 Sup. Ct. 182, 70 L. Ed. 435; United States v. Magnolia
Petroleum *Co., (1928), 276 U. S. 160, 162, 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 236, 72 L. Ed.
509; Brewster v. Gage, (1930) 280 U. S. 327, 337, 50 Sup. Ct. 115, 74 L
Ed. 457. See also Commonwealth v. Duane, (1809) 1 Binn. (Pa.) 601, 608;
Whitman v. Hapgood (1813) 10 Mass. 437, 439; People v. Tibbets, (1825),
4 Cow. (N.Y.) 384, 391, 392; 1 Kent Comm. 454.
23The Brig Ann, (1812) 1 Gall C. C. 62, 66; Matthews v. Zane, (1822)
7 Wheat. (U.S.) 164, 1211, 5 L. Ed. 425. See also, I Kent Comm. 454.
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against laws which commenced on the date of enactment and which
operated in futuro, but which, in doing so, divested rights, particularly property rights, which had been vested anterior to tile
time of enactment of the laws. Prior to this development, as indicated above, the principle had been invoked against retroactive
laws which operated only on acts from a time before the passage
of those laws or on cases arising during this past time. Also, it
was against past negotiis that the Code and the common law had
directed their prohibitions. This older interpretation had not included those laws which divested rights vested antecedently to
enactment in applying to cases arising prospectively.24
It was Mr. Justice Story who was the first to point out the
difference between these two meanings of "retroactive laws.""5
This he did in 1814 in the case of Society for the Propagation of
the Gospel in Foreign Partsv. Wheeler,'2 1 decided while he was on
circuit. In construing the term "retrospective law" he said:
"Is it confined to statutes, which are enacted to take effect
from a time anterior to their passage, or (toes it embrace all statutes,
which, though operating only from their passage, affect vested
rights and past transactions?"
He answered this query by declaring:
"It would be a construction utterly subversive of all the objects
of the provision, to adhere to the former definition. . . . Upon
principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing law, or creates a new obligation, imposes
a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions
or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective ... "
Story cited with approval and relied upon thlw
opinion of Chief
Justice Kent in the case of Dash v. Van Kleeck, " decided only a
few years before. In that case a defense was given to the sheriff
in actions for escapes by a statute passed after the escape had
' 4 See Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, A History of Our

Constitutional Theory 199, note 16, "The true sense of the term

retroactive

or retrospective legislati n would appear to be legislation which operated on
past 25acts from a time anterior to its passage."
That there is no distinction between these two kinds of retroactive
laws and that they were both objectionable had previously been advanced by
Parsons, C. J., of Massachusetts. In Bacon v. Callender, (1810) 6 Mass.
303, 309 he said: "The demandant has not contested the constitutionality of
this statute, so far as may affect actions sued after its passage; but
denies it as affecting actions pending at that time.-We see no ground for
this distinction; and if it were competent for the legislature to make these
provisions, to affect actions after to be commenced; the same provisions
might apply with equal authority to actions then pending."
26(1814) 2 Gall. C. C. 105.
27(1814) 2 Gall. C. C. 105, 139.

28(1811) 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291.
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occurred and the suit had commenced upon it. The law at the
time of the escape did not provide the sheriff with the defense
given by the Act, which would have defeated the plaintiff's suit
if it had been applied in this particular case. The Act was construed, under the authority of our maxim, not to apply to this case
but only to actions for escapes occurring after the enactment of
the statute. The Chief Justice declared: "The construction here
contended for on the part of the defendant, would make the
statute operate unjustly. It would make it defeat a suit already
commenced upon a right already vested. This would be punishing an innocent party with costs, as well as devesting him of a
right previously acquired under the existing law."2- He also cited
the provision of the Roman Law and declared that the principle
"relates not merely to future suits, but to future as contradistinguished from past contracts and vested rights.""0 Story, in
relying upon the authority of this case, said: "in a fit case, depending upon elementary principles, I would be disposed to go a great
31
way with the learned argument of Chief Justice Kent.
It is interesting to note here that Kent's opinion went considerably beyond the facts of the Van Kleeck Case. In order to render
his decision he need not have gone as far as he did in his opinion.
The law was retroactive in the common law meaning of that term
-i.e. it applied to an act from a time anterior to the enactment
of the law. The law was not retroactive in the sense of destroying a right vested prior to the enactment of the law by its application to cases arising subsequently. Consequently, it was not necessary for him -to state that the principle "relates not merely to future
suits, but to future as contradistinguished from past contracts and
vested rights." Furthermore, he declared that the civil law principle had held to the same construction, thus giving his expanded
interpretation the support of authority. He failed to recognize
the distinction between the two types of retroactive laws which
Story was later frank to admit. In this way the vested rights of
property received the protection of a principle which had been
recognized as fundamental for centuries. Thus, by definition, any
law which destroyed a right vested before the law was passed
became retroactive, regardless of whether it commenced upon
enactment or anterior to that time.
29(1811) 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 502, 5 Am. Dec. 291.
30(1811) 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 504, 5 Am. Dec. 291.
3"Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Wheeler,
(1814) 2 Gall. C. C. 105 at p. 139.
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While it was Kent and Story who had, by definition, established in American law this union of our principle with the doctrine of vested rights, nevertheless that the trend of judicial action
had already been that way seems clear. A few English judges had
already brought our principle, as a rule of construction, to the defense of proprietarian rights. As early as 1769 Lord Mansfield
in Couch, qui tarn v.Jeffries 2 refused to construe an Act of Parliament to discharge the defendant from a penalty for which the
plaintiff had already recovered a verdict.
"Here is a right vested; and it is not to be imagined that the
legislature could by general words mean to take it away from the
person in whom it was so legally vested, and who had been at a
great deal of cost and charge in prosecuting. .

.

.It can never be

the true construction of this act; to take away this vested right,
and punish the innocent pursuers of it with costs.""3
In 1790 Lord Kenyon in Williamns v. Pritchard4 refused to construe the words of a general statute to remove immunity from
taxation which had been given by a prior Act of Parliament.
The English courts, however, had not gone as far as the Kentian
and Storian definition of retroactive laws.
In so far as the principle was applied by the courts as a rule
of construction, the union with the doctrine of vested rights is
made clear. Here, the Kentian and Storian interpretation and
definition were widely accepted. Thus the rule of interpretation
came in many cases to be not so much a prohibition against construing all laws retrospectively in the sense of applying them to a past
time, but more often an inhibition against a construction which
would give such a retrospective operation to a statute which, because of this very interpretation, would violate vested rights. 5
32(1769) 4 Burr. 2460.
83(1769) 4 Burr. 2460, 2462. The English courts continued to use our
principle in the defense of vested rights in the Nineteenth Century. See
Moon v. Durden, (1848) 2 Exch. 22, 12 Jur. 138; Marsh v. Higgins, (1850)
9 C. & B. 551, 1 L. M. & P. 253, 19 L. J.C. P. 297; Waugh v. Middleton,
(1853) 8 Exch. 352, 22 L. J.Ex. 109, 20 L. T. 0. S.262; Jackson v. Woolcy,
(1858) 8 El. & Bl. 778, Reid v. Reid, (1886) 31 Ch. Div. 402, 55 L. J.
Ch. 294, 54 L. T. 100, 34 W. R. 332, 2 T. L. R. 254. See also Wright v.
Hale, (1860) 6 H. & N. 227, 30 L. J.Ex. 40, 3 L. T. 444, 6 Jur. N. S.1212,
9 W. R. 157; The Ironsides, (1862) 1 Lush. 458, 465, 31 L. J. P. M. & A.
219, 6 L. T. 59, 1 Mar. L. C. 200.
84(1790) 4 D. & E. 2. Compare with New Jersey v. Wilson, (1812) 7
Cr. (U.S.) 164, 3 L. Ed. 303.
15Many courts brought the prohibition against retroactive legislation.
whether in the form of a rule of construction or of a principle of natural law
or of a constitutional denial of power to enact such laws, directly to service
as a protection of vested rights. Within the scope of this prohibition are
included laws which are retroactive in both the narrower and broader meanings of the term. See Merrill v. Sherburne, (1818) 1 N. H. 199, 213, 214,
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Also, Story's broader definition that a retrospective law is one
which "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing
law, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already
past," was frequently acepted by the courts as giving the true meaning of the principle. Thus, some courts refused to follow the original principle that all retroactive laws which worked to the disadvantage of parties were undesirable or to be discouraged. In fact,
they occasionally declared that some retroactive laws," even though
they impaired established interests, were necessary and desirable, 8
8 Am. Dec. 52; Lewis v. Brackenridge, (1822)

1 Blackf. (Ind) 220, 12
Am. Dec. 228; Kennebec Purchase v. Laboree, (1823) 2 Greenl. (Me.) 275,
11 Am. Dec. 79; Bell v. Perkins, (1823) Peck (Tenn.) 261, 14 Am. Dec.
745; People ex rel. Fleming v. Livingston, (1831) 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 526,
531: "But it cannot be denied that the legislature possesses the power to
take away by statute what was given by statute, except vested rights."
Sayer v. Wisner, (1832) 8 Wend. (N.Y.) 661; Addridge v. Tuscumbia,
C. & D.LR. R., (1832) 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 199, 23 Am. Dec. 307, 312: "I
therefore conclude that if a retrospective law, when applied to civil cases,
takes away no vested right to property, it would not be unconstitutional."
Conklin v. Egerton's Administrator, (1839) 21 Wend. (N.Y.) 430, 435;
Clark v. Clark, (1839) 10 N. H. 380, 34 Am. Dec. 165; McPherson v.
Cheadell, (1840) 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 15, 28, 29; Wynne's Lessee v. Wynne,
(1852) 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 405, 58 Am. Dec. 66, 69; The state constitutional
prohibition against the enactment of retrospective laws was interpreted to
mean "a law infringing or divesting vested rights." Westervelt v. Gregg,
(1854) 12 N. Y. 202, 62 Am. Dec. 160; Wynehamer v. People, (1856) 13
N. Y. 378, 12 How. Pract. 238, 2 Parker Cr. 1 421; Conway v. Cable,
(1865) 37 Ill. 82, 87 Am. Dec. 240, 241; Drehman v. Stifel, (1867) 41 Mo.
184, 97 Am. Dec. 268; Williams v. Johnson, (1869) 30 Md. 500, 96 Am.
Dec. 613; People ex rel. Pells v. Supervisors, (1875) 65 N. Y. 300;
McCahill v. Hamilton, (1880), 20 Hun (N.Y.) 388; Bullock v. Town of
Durham, (1892) 64 Hun (N.Y.) 380, 19 N. Y. S. 635, 46 N. Y. St. Rep.
459; Matter of Frost's Estate, (1919) 107 Misc. Rep. 118, 175 N. Y. S.
723; Rusk v. Knight, (1921) 196 App. Div. 99, 187 N. Y. S. 747; Arnold &
Murdock Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1924) 314 Il. 251, 145 N. E. 342,
40 A. L. R. 1470. See also, Holbrook v. Finney, (1808) 4 Mass. 566, 3 Am.
Dec. 243; Somerset v. Dighton, (1815) 12 Mass. 383, 385; Welch v. Wadsworth, (1861) 30 Conn. 149, 79 Am. Dec. 236; Smith v. Dirckx, (1920)
283 Mo. 188, 223 S. W. 104, 11 A. L. R. 510, 516; Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3
Dall. (U.S.) 386, 391, 1 L. Ed. 648.
3
6See, for example, Goshen v. Stonington, (1822) 4 Conn. 209, 10 Am.
Dec. 121, 126; "On the other hand, laws of a retroactive nature, affecting
the rights of individuals, not adverse to equitable principles and highly
promotive of the general good, have often been passed and as often approved....
I very much question whether there is an existing government
in which laws of a retroactive nature and effect, impairing vested rights,
but promotive of justice and the general good, have not been passed." Boston
v. Cummins, (1854) 16 Ga. 102, 60 Am. Dec. 717, 720: "I hold that there
are numerous cases where retrospective laws operate for the benefit of the
community. To repudiate them altogether would be to obliterate a large
portion of the statute law of this state." See also, Jones v. Jones, (1804) 2
Overton (Tenn.) 2, 5 Am. Dec. 645; Holbrook v. Finney, (1808) 4 Mass.
566, 3 Am. Dec. 243; Fleming v. Livingston, (1831) 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 526;
Wynne's Lessee v. Wynne, (1852) 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 405, 58 Am. Dec. 66.
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and the frequent dictum of the United States Supreme Court that
all retrospective laws per se were not contrary to the Constitution
implies this. Furthermore, those cases in which the courts expressed the older idea, which condemned in general terms all retroactive laws, were frequently cases in which the court thought
that the statutes had impaired vested rights. It is clear from an
analysis of all of these cases that the laws which were to he discouraged or prohibited were those which injured or destroyed
The position taken in these cases marks the pre-Civil War origins of the
concept of the Police Power, which, under its great post war development,
was restrictive of vested rights in that the state could regulate proprietariall
interests in the protection of public health, safety, morals, and the general
welfare. See also, Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 DalI. (U.S.) 386, 391, 1 L.
Ed. 648.
It must be noted here that there is one type of law which has not been
forbidden by our principle. That is the curative law, which validates past
acts that would have been otherwise void. It is the law which ratifies and
gives approval to an act already performed, but defective and thus either
void or voidable. This kind of law was viewed as desirable and necessary.
See, for example, Bell v. Perkins, (1823) Peck. (Tenn.) 261, 14 Am. Dec.
745; Baugher v. Nelson, (1850) 9 Md. (Gill.) 299, 52 Am. Dec. 694;
People, ex rel. Pells v. Supervisors, (1875) 65 N. Y. 300; Bullock v. Town
of Durham, (1892) 64 Hun 380, 19 N. Y. S. 635, 46 N. Y. St. Rep. 459.
Compare the common law maxim Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato
priori aequiparatur, which gave approval to such laws. Grim v. Weissenberg
School Dist., (1868) 57 Pa. St. 433, 98 Am. Dec. 237, 241; Cassell v. Carroll, (1826) 11 Wheat. (U.S.) 134, 6 L. Ed. 438; White Water Valley
Canal Co. v. Vallette, (1858) 21 How. (U.S.) 414, 16 L. Ed. 154: Prize
Cases, (1862) 2 BI. (U.S.) 635, 17 L. Ed. 459; Mechanics' & Traders'
Bank v. Union Bank, (1874) 22 Wall. (U.S.) 276, 22 L. Ed. 871 ; Jefferson
City Gas-Light Co. v. Clark, (1877) 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. Ed. 521: Atoe
County v. Baldwin, (1884), 111 U. S. 1, 4 Sup. Ct. 265, 28 L. Ed. 331:
Mitchell v. Clark, (1884) 110 U. S. 633, 4 Sup. Ct. 312; 28 L. Ed. 279:
Anderson v. Santa Anna, (1886) 116 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 413, 29
L. Ed. 633; Bolles v. Brimfield, (1887), 120 U. S. 759; 7 Sup. Ct. 736, 30
L. Ed. 786; Comanche County v. Lewis, (1890) 133 U. S. 198. 10 Sup. Ct.
286, 33 L. Ed. 604; Street v. United States, (1890) 133 U. S. 299, 10 Sup.
Ct. 309, 33 L. Ed. 631; DeLima v. Bidwell, (1901) 182 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct.
743, 45 L. Ed. 1041; Turpin v. Lemon, (1902) 187 U. S. 51, 57, 23 Sup.
Ct. 20, 47 L. Ed. 70; McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel Co., (1902) 185
U. S. 505, 513, 22 Sup. Ct. 758, 46 L. Ed. 1012; United States v. Heinszen.
(1907) 206 U. S. 370, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 51 L. Ed. 1098; Tiaco v. Forbes.
(1913) 228 U. S. 549, 33 Sup. Ct. 585, 57 L. Ed. 960; Forbes Pioneer Boat
Line v. Everglades Drainage District, (1922) 258 U. S. 338, 42 Sup. Ct. 325,
66 L. Ed. 647. But some curative laws, by impairing vested rights or otherwise working an injury to parties, were condemned by our principle. The
distinction between the approved and disapproved curative laws has been
stated by Judge T. M. Cooley, The Limits to Legislative Power in the
Passage of Curative Laws, (1881) 12 Cent. L. Jr. 3, 4, "If one curative law
may be held good, and another not good, the result is that the validity of
legislation in this class of cases must depend upon the view the court may
take of its justice. If, in the opinion of the court, it operates unjustly, it
must be held void; but if not, it may be upheld." The American doctrine,
like the English, applied our principle only to those laws which the courts
thought were injurious, either because they destroyed vested rights or were
unjust for other reasons. See Welch v. Wadsworth, (1861) 30 Conn. 149,
79 Am. Dec. 236; Conway v. Cable, (1865) 37 Ill. 82, 87 Am. Dec. 240.
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previously acquired proprietarian interests. Consequently, the
principle under discussion here came more and more to be limited
to apply to retrospective laws which impaired vested rights in both
the older common law and the broader Kentian and Storian meanings.
In this phase of the development the courts were exercising
what has been recognized as a type of judicial review. That is,
the courts were not necessarily declaring statutes invalid but they
were restricting their operation very drastically to narrow limits
by the route of construction. As indicated above, the power of
judicial review, in its narrower and more usual sense, was a very
important instrument of American courts in completing the steps
through which we are tracing the development of our principle of
jurisprudence. This occurs at the time the courts held that laws
which were retroactive in both senses of the term and which impaired vested rights were void, first, because they were in violation of the rules of the natural law, and, subsequently, because
they were contrary to various provisions of the United States and
state constitutions.
At the same time and in the same case that Kent brought about
the union of the principle with the doctrine of vested rights, he
established the transmutation of the former into a transcendental
limitation. The significance of these two developments in this
principle is that it ceased to be solely a rule of construction. It
now became a limitation placed by the higher law on the power of
the legislature, and the courts made it effective. This principle,
nevertheless, remained as a rule of construction. Consequently,
where the courts could protect vested rights by interpretation they
would do so, but where this was impossible the statute would be
held invalid. In general, it might be said that the principle was
frequently a rule of construction where the law was retroactive in
the older sense of the term, but that it was always a rule of the
higher law where the law was retroactive in the newer sense. This
was true by definition. It was by the broader definition, as shown
above, that the principle was united with the doctrine of vested
rights, and no statute was invalid within this definition unless it
did divest such rights.
This transmutation undoubtedly preserved the principle and
established it permanently in American law, but the change was
made by the courts more because of the fundamental nature of the
doctrine of vested rights than because of the significance of the
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principle. This is true even though many of the judges approached
the matter from the point of view of the ancient prejudice against
retroactive laws, and emphasized the importance of the principle
expressing that prejudice. It was property rights, however, which
the courts wanted to protect. Our principle was the instrument,
and it became more effective at the time it was given a transcendental nature.
Accordingly, it'was Chancellor Kent who established this transmutation in Dash v. Van Kleeck 3 7 and his opinion in that case has
been cited frequently by other American courts. At that time, of
course, Kent did not hold the statute void. He was justifying the
authority of the common law maxim nova constitutio futuris formain imponere debet, et non praeteritis as a rule of construction,
but in his opinion he brought this maxim and our principle within
the scope of the natural law limitations on the legislature.
"This construction is agreeable to those settled rules which the
wisdom of the common law has established for the interpretation
of statutes, as it is not inconvenient, nor against reason, and injures no person. A statute is never to be construed as against
the plain and obvious dictates of reason. The common law, says
Lord Coke, (8 Co. 118.a) adjudgeth a statute so far void; .. .
The very essence of a new law is a rule for future cases."38
This maxim is "a principle which has become venerable for tile
antiquity and the universality of its sanctions, and is acknowledged
as an element of jurisprudence."3 9
Professor Corwin has already conclusively shown the significance of the natural law in the development of American legal
history and its use in defending vested rights from infringement
by legislative action. He has also shown the very important part
which Kent has played in establishing these limitations. 4' It is
:7(1811) 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291.
38(1811) 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 502, 5 Am. Dec. 291.
39(1811) 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 503, 5 Am. Dec. 291. The "train of
authority declaratory of the common sense and reason of the most civilized
states, ancient and modern, on the point before us, is sufficient, as I apprehend, to put it at rest; and to cause not only the judicial, but even the

legislative authority to bow with reverence to such a sanction" at p. 508. See
also 1 Kent, Comm. 455, 456; "A retrospective statute affecting and changing
vested rights, is very generally considered, in this country, as founded on
unconstitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void."

40See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil
War, (1911) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 460; The Basic Doctrine of American
Constitutional Law, (1914) 12 Mich. L. Rev. 247; The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law, (1928-1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev.
149, 365. See also Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial
Decisions, (1916) 25 Yale L. J. 617 and The Revival of Natural Law Concepts; Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law.
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important to remember, therefore, that Kent was a strong believer
in transcendental limitations on government and that he frequently
identified the common law with the natural law. As already
shown, the principle came into American law by way of the common law and had even been coined into a legal maxim. The common law viewed its maxims as its fundamental principles.
Kent, then, made two important changes in our principle in the
Van Kleeck Case, as shown above. In the first place, he provided
Story with the idea of two definitions of retroactive laws. In the
second place, Kent established the transmutation of the principle, in
its broader sense, into a transcendental limitation on legislative
power.4 Both of these changes were made by Kent in a case
where the law was really retroactive in its older and narrower
sense of applying to a case which had already begun, and where he
was actually using the principle in its older form as a rule of
construction and not as a limitation on legislative power. The result of this development is that where a general law impairs rights
vested prior to enactment, either by applying to cases arising
previously or subsequently, it will be void as a violation of the
higher law, if the court cannot construe it to render it innocuous.
Accordingly, then, we find the courts holding that retroactive
laws which impaired vested rights were contrary to justice, violations of the social compact or of the very principles upon which
our government was based, or were not properly an exercise of the
legislative power at all. 42 Such laws were held to be forbidden
41In some earlier American cases the validity of retroactive laws which
impaired vested rights had already been called into question. Vales v.
Stetson, (1806) 2 Mass. 143, 3 Am. Dec. 39, and Bacon v. Callender,
(1810) 6 Mass. 303. In other earlier cases the "law of the land" clauses of
state constitutions had already been invoked in order to invalidate such laws:
University v. Foy, (1805) 3 N. C. 310, 374, 3 Am. Dec. 672, 5 N. C. 58; and
Little v. Frost, (1807) 3 Mass. 106.
42As in the English common law, American courts also united our
principle with ideas of the nature of laws. Operation in the future was
viewed as a vital characteristic of a law. Consequently, it was but a step for
American courts to bring the doctrine of separation of powers to the support of our principle. The legislative function, which alone was given to
the legislature, was that of enacting laws. A retroactive statute not being
law, its enactment was beyond the power of the legislature. See Mferrill v.
Sherburne, (1818) 1 N. H. 199, 212, 213, 8 Am. Dec. 52; Grim v. Weissenberg School District, (1868) 57 Pa. St. 433, 98 Am. Dec. 237, 240; See also
Ogden v. Blackledge, (1804) 2 Cranch (U.S.) 272, 2 L. Ed. 276; Dupy v.
Wickwire, (1814) 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) 237, 6 Am. Dec. 729; Somerset v.
Dighton, (1815) 12 Mass. 383.
The doctrine of separation of powers was not greatly relied upon, however. It was open to many objections because it could be used conveniently
only where the law was retroactive in the older sense. Consequently, the
natural law and constitutional provisions of due process provided the only

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

by or in violation of first principles, reason, justice, or the nature
of our government.

43

The United States Supreme Court also used the transcendental
nature of the principle as authority for invalidating laws. In some
cases, as will be shown below, it was combined with a specific
provision of the United States constitution 44 but in others it stood
alone as the sole authority.45 The power of the court to hold void
the acts of the legislature on the ground that they violated the
principles of the higher law, however, was challenged very early in
American constitutional history in the case of Calder v. Bu1!, 4 0 and
protection to vested rights from the broader type of retroactive laws in the
Kentian
and Storian sense.
43
See Goshen v. Stonington, (1822) 4 Conn. 209, 10 Am. Dec. 121;
Lewis v. Brackenridge, (1822) 1 Blackf. (2nd) 220, 12 Am. Dec. 228;
Kennebec Purchase v. Laboree, (1823) 2 Greenl. (Me.) 275, 11 Am. Dec.
79; Woart v. Winnick, (1826), 3 N. H. 473, 14 Am. Dec. 384; Wynne's
Lessee v. Wynne, (1852) 2 Swan (Tenn.) 405, 58 Am. Dec. 66; Welch v.
Wadsworth, (1861) 30 Conn. 149, 79 Am. Dec. 236; Conway v. Cable,
(1865) 37 Ill. 82, 87 Am. Dec. 240, 241 ; "But few principles are better settled
than that the legislature is powerless to divest, by enactment, an individual
of a vested legal right. . . . Such legislation, under our form of government,
has always been supposed to be unwarrantable, as being opposed to the
principles of natural justice, and depriving persons of their property contrary to due course of law." Williams v. Johnson, (1869) 30 Md. 500;
96 Am. Dec. 613; People ex rel. Pells v. Supervisors, (1875) 65 N. Y. 300.
See also I Kent, Comm. 455. See footnote 21.
44Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648; Fletcher v.
Peck, (1810), 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
45
Story, J., in Terrett v. Taylor, (1815) 9 Cranch (U.S.) 43, 3 L. Ed.
650. See also his opinion in Green v. Biddle, (1823), 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 12,
5 L. Ed. 547. But compare Watson v. Mercer, (1834) 8 Pet. (U.S.) 88,
110, 8 L. Ed. 876: ". . . it is clear that this court has no right to pronounce
an act of the state legislature void, as contrary to the constitution of the
United States, from the mere fact that it devests antecedent vested rights of
property. The constitution of the United States does not prohibit the states
from passing retrospective laws generally, but only ex post facto laws."
See opinion of Johnson, J., in Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.)
87, at p. 143, 3 L. Ed. 162. See also Society etc. v. New Haven, (1823) 8
Wheat. (U.S.) 464, 493, 494, 5 L. Ed. 632; Ogden v. Blackledge, (1804)
2 Cranch (U.S.) 272, 2 L. Ed. 276.
46(1798) 3 DalI. (U.S.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648. Chase, J. thought that the
legislature was limited by the natural law: (at p. 387, 388). "I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature or that it is absolute and
without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained
by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the state. . . . The purposes for
which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the
social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power,
they will decide what are the proper objects of it; the nature, and ends of
legislative power will limit the exercise of it. . . . There are certain vital
principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and
overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; and to authorize manifest injustice by positive law, to take away that security for personal
liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was
established."
Iredell, J., on the other hand, (at p. 398) declared that if no limitations
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as a matter of fact, the principle was applied by the United States
Supreme Court as a limitation placed by the natural law on legislative power in only a few cases. 47 Instead, it found its way into
the United States constitution by the process of interpretation.
Thus, the judicial prejudice against retroactive laws, in both senses
of the term, applied by the courts in the form of a rule of construction and of the natural law, was translated into the system
of constitutional limitations on the power of the legislature. The
result is that the courts will construe a statute, where possible,
to eliminate the objections against it as expressed by the broadened
principle, but where this is impossible the Act will be held to be
unconstitutional as a violation of the ex post facto, contract, or
due process clauses of the United States constitution. It is submitted here that the conclusion of this development is to leave the
principle in the same position it was in with the Storian interpretation and the Kentian identification of it as one of the principles of the higher law, which existed prior to the state and
which limited the legislative power of the government. 9
The first step in incorporating the principle into the system of
constitutional limitations was taken in Calder v. Bull.9 0 There, the
ex post facto clauses of the constitution were held to forbid the
enactment of criminal laws which worked disadvantageously to
the defendant. The decision, however, was restrictive rather than
expansive, so far as the principle is concerned, because those
clauses of the constitution were limited to criminal laws. Thus,
the contention that the constitution forbade the enactment of all
retroactive laws was denied. It was on this ground that Mr.
Justice Johnson later objected to Chase's opinion in that case, and
contended that the term "ex post facto" authentically and properly
applied to all retroactive laws because all were unjust and contrary to the proper nature of law.5
were imposed on the legislature by the constitution, whatever it "chose to
enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void. It is true, that some speculative jurists have held.
that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I
cannot think that, under such a government, any court of Justice would
possess power to declare it so."
47See footnotes 44 and 45.
48
The courts have read higher law principles into provisions of the
United States constitution by way of construction. See the authorities cited.
infootnote
40.
49 Compare the maxim, "The court will look to the substance and not
to the form."
50(1798) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648.
51
See his note, (1829) 2 Pet. 681. It seems impossible, on the basis of
authority, to decide this controversy, although Johnson seems to have had the
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It is not to be said, however, that Chase and Johnson differed
in their position on the evils of retroactive legislation. In fact,
they were agreed on that point and both thought that the power
to enact them should be denied to the legislature. Chase thought
that this power was forbidden by the natural law, and later Johnson freely endorsed this position. They were of the same mind,
viz., that property rights, once vested, should be protected from
impairment by retroactive laws. But when it came to constitutional limitations, the difference was one of the convenience of
the instrument for limiting the legislative power in this respect.
Thus, Johnson argued that, it being agreed that all retroactive
laws were injurious, they should be prevented by the broader
construction of the ex post facto clauses of the constitution. Because of the narrower construction laid down in Calder v. Bull, he
declared, the court would be required "to toil up hill" to bring
within the purview of the constitution that protection of vested
stronger position. In the first place, some of the authorities can be cited
for either, both, or neither construction because they are ambiguous. Thus,
it can be said that Blackstone (1 Comm. 46) limited ex post facto to
criminal laws or that he merely gave a criminal law as an example of what
he meant because it showed more glaringly the injustice, which was the
reason lying at the basis of the condemnation of retroactive legislation.
There is nothing in the Commentaries to show definitely what Blackstone
meant. Likewise, the Federalist does not decide the question unless a
great deal is read into the words used there. See Number 44, where it is
said that the constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws and laws impairing the obligations of contracts are constitutional bulwarks "in favour of personal security and private rights." Chase
interpreted this to mean that "personal security" refers to bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws and that "private rights" refers to the contract clause.
Does ex post facto refer to both "personal security" and "private rights?"

In support of Johnson's construction it must be said that the term had
been used repeatedly in the more general sense. Bacon used it both civilly

and criminally. (See, footnote 16) Regula 8 refers to criminal cases.
Regula 21, on the other hand, applied the term civilly. "Clausula vel
dispositio inutilis per praesumptionem vel causam remotam, ex post facto
non fulcitur." Coke, likewise, used the term in the civil sense: (Co. Litt.
241a) ". . . the entrie of the disseisee may be taken away for a time, and
by matter ex post facto revived againe." Other English writers and some

court decisions also used the term in the civil sense. See John Godolphin,
A View of Admiralty Jurisdiction 109; 1 Fearne, Essays on Contingent

Remainders, 5th ed., 420; 1 Sheppard, The Touchstone of Common Assurances (Amer. ed. of 1808) 63; Wilkinson v. Meyer, (1723) 2 Ld. Raym.
1350, 1352, 8 Mod. Rep. 173; Hitchcock v. Way, (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 943,
2 New. & P. K. B. 72, 6 L. J. K. B. 215. See also 2 Wooddeson, Laws of
England, 641.
On the other hand, in support of Chase's construction, contemporary
opinion leaned strongly to an interpretation which limited the term to
criminal laws, although this was not unanimously so. See 2 Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 448, 449, 617; III, 100, 328.
But see Den, ex dem. Low v. Goldtrap, (1795) 1 N. J. L. 315, 319; State v.
Parkhurst, (1802) 9 N. J. L. 528, 551. See also Corwin, The Twilight of
the Supreme Court 198, note 9.
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rights from infringement by retroactive laws which our expanded
principle required.
And Mr. Justice Johnson was right. The United States Supreme Court soon found that if it was to protect vested rights
from retroactive laws under the constitution, the contract clause
must be given a broad interpretation. Chase had based his construction of the term ex post facto partially on his interpretation
of the contract clause. Thus, he had decided that this clause protected property rights from retroactive laws, and had held that
if the broader construction were to be given the ex post facto
clause the former clause would become superfluous. This interpretation was later followed on the ground that those contracts
made subsequent to the enactment of a law could not be impaired
by that law because it became part of the contract. Only those
laws which affected previous contracts could impair the obligations
of those contracts.52
Also, the word "contract" was construed broadly to include
both executed contracts under which property had already vested,
and executory contracts. 53 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall held in
Fletcher v. Peck that a law of Georgia repealing former statutes,
which had conveyed land, was invalid. "When, then, a law is in
its nature a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that
contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest these rights."'"
As indicated above, the appeal to the higher law was originally
a very important step or aid to this construction. Story is con52See Sturges v. Crowninshield, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122, 206,
207, 4 L. Ed. 529; M'Millan v. M'Neill, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 209,
4 L. Ed. 552; Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Pa. v. Smith, (1821) 6
Wheat. (U.S.) 131, 5 L. Ed. 224; Washington, Thompson, & Trimble, JJ.,
in Ogden v. Saunders, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 213, 6 L. Ed. 606:
Washington, J., dissenting in Mason v. Haile, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.)
370, 6 L. Ed. 660; Satterlee v. Mfatthewson, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 380.
413, 7 L. Ed. 454; Bronson v.Kinzie, (1843) 1 How. (U.S.) 311, 11 L. Ed.

143; Curtis v. Whitney, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 68, 20 L. Ed. 513; Lehigh
Water Co. v. Easton, (1887) 121 U. S.388, 7 Sup. Ct. 916, 30 L. Ed. 1059;
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.Texas, (1909) 212 U. S.86, 29 Sup. Ct. 220, 53 L.

Ed. 417; Lewis v. Brackenridge, (1822) 12 Am. Dec. 228, 1 Blackf.
(Ind.) 220. But see, contra, the opinions of Johnson, J., in Fletcher v.Peck.

(1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 3 L. Ed. 162; Marshall, C. J., Story, Johnson,

& Duvall, JJ., in Ogden v. Saunders, (1827)

6 L.55Ed. 606.

12 Wheat. (U.S.)

213.

See cases cited in footnote 52. See also Terrett v.Taylor. (1815)
9 Cranch (U.S.) 43, 3 L. Ed. 650; New Jersey v. Wilson, (1812) 7
Cranch (U.S.) 164, 3 L. Ed. 303; Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 683, 4 L. Ed. 629; People v.Platt, (1819) 17
Johns. (N.Y.) 195, 8 Am. Dec. 382; Winter v.Jones, (1851) 10 Ga. 190,
54 Am. Dec. 379; Trustees v. Bailey, (1862) 10 Fla. 112, 81 Am. Dec. 194.
54Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, at p. 135, 3 L. Ed. 162.
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spicuous in his reliance solely on the natural law by his decision
in Terrett v. Taylor5" that the doctrine that a legal grant was
revocable by another law was "utterly inconsistent with a great
and fundamental principle of a republican government, the right of
the citizens to the free enjoyment of their property legally acquirel." 6 The court, he declared was
"standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the
fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and
the letter of the constitution of the United States, and upon the
decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a
doctrine."57
Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck placed his decision on
both the contract clause, with its broad interpretation, and on the
natural law, whereas Mr. Justice Johnson, who objected to the
limitation of that clause in the constitution to retroactive laws,
placed his position solely on the higher law.
"I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the
power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a principle which will
impose laws even on the Deity." 8
Even this development does not mark the limit to which the
principle, as interpreted by Kent and Story, has been incorporated
into the constitution. The doctrine of vested rights is too vital
to American law to have permitted so restricted a development of
the judicial prejudice against retroactive laws. The next step
was to incorporate the principles into those "catch-all" provisions
of the constitution-the due process of law clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.5 9 Those cases in which the United
States Supreme Court has said that retroactive laws are not unconstitutional unless they are ex post facto or impair the obligations of
contracts6" have been cases in which there were no infringements of
property rights which the court was desirous of preventing.
55(1815) 9 Cranch (U.S.) 43, 3 L. Ed. 650. See also the other cases
there56cited.
Terrett v. Taylor, (1815) 9 Cranch (U.S.) 43, 50, 51, 3 L. Ed. 650.
57Terrett
v. Taylor, (1815) 9 Cranch (U.S.) 43, 52, 3 L. Ed. 650.
58
Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 143, 3 L. Ed. 162.
59
A few state courts had already brought our principle within the
purview of the "law of the land" and the due process clauses of their state
constitutions. See footnote 41. See also Westervelt v. Gregg, (1854)
12 N. Y. 202, 62 Am. Dec. 160; Wynehamer v. People, (1856) 13 N. Y.
378, 12 How. Prac. 238, 2 Parker Cr. R. 421. Edward S. Corwin.
The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, (1911) 24
Harv. L. Rev. 366, 460.
6OSee Satterlee v. Matthewson, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 380, 7 L. Ed.
454; Charles River Bridge v. Warren River Bridge, (1837) II Pet.
(U.S.) 420, 639, 9 L. Ed. 773; Baltimore & Susquehanna R. Co. v.
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The due process clauses are not particular renditions of our
principle nor have they been interpreted to forbid retroactive laws
per se.61 Nevertheless, although a law is not a violation of due
process merely because it is retroactive, it is a violation of this
constitutional requirement where it destroys property rights arbitrarily or does not give notice and opportunity for a hearing. And
it may be an unreasonable law or it may deny a hearing solely
because it is retroactive. The case of Ochoa v. Hernandez y
Morales 2 shows this well. Here there was an order of the military governor of Porto Rico in 1899 which reduced from twenty
years to six years the period during which possession must continue in order to convert an entry of possession into a record of
ownership, and the order specifically provided that it should be
retroactive. Plaintiffs claimed ownership of the land, and defendant, who was in possession, claimed title by virtue of tile
order. At the time the order was made the six-year period had
already run against the plaintiffs without giving them an opportunity to assert their rights. It was held that this order was invalid as a violation of due process of law because it enabled the
defendant, who had no title to the land but only a claim by possession, to procure title immediately without notice to the owners.
It was like an order taking the land from the plaintiff and giving
it to the defendant. That the order in this case was a violation
of the due process clause because it was retroactive, is made clear
when Mr. Justice Pitney declared that this unconstitutionality resulted from the retroactive feature of the order and that the order
should be limited to cases where the owner still had a reasonable
opportunity to contest the claims of the possessor.
63
This case is akin to the rule as to statutes of limitations.
Nesbit, (1850) 10 How. (U.S.) 395, 401, 13 L. Ed. 469; Webster v.
Cooper, (1852) 14 How. (U.S.) 488, 14 L. Ed. 510; Drehman v. Stifle,
(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 595, 19 L. Ed. 508: Curtis v. Whitney. (1871 13
Wall. (U.S.) 68, 20 L. Ed. 513; Blount v. Windley, (1877) 95 U. S. 173,
24 L. Ed. 424.
6Baltimore and Susquehanna R. Co. v. Nesbit, (1850) 10 How. (U.S.)
395, 13 L. Ed. 469, Brewer, J., speaking of this case in League v. Texas,
(1902) 184 U. S. 156, 161, 22 Sup. Ct. 475, 46 L. Ed. 478: "This decision.
it is true, was before the fourteenth amendment, and the restrictions placed
by the amendment upon state action apply to retrospective, as well as to
prospective, legislation. But it contains no prohibition of retrospective
legislation as such, and therefore now, as before, the mere fact that a
statute is retroactive in its operation does not make it repugnant to the
federal constitution."
62(1913) 230 U. S. 139, 33 Sup. Ct. 1033, 57 L. Ed. 1427.
63
See Sohn v. Waterson (1873) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 596, 21 L. Ed. 737;
Terry v. Anderson, (1877) 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. Ed. 365; Mitchell v.
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Where such statutes are retroactive to the extent that the period of
limitations, within which the case must be brought, has run prior to
the enactment of the Acts, they are equivalent to a destruction of
the property right involved. Consequently, such statutes must either
begin to run on actions from the time they are enacted, or leave
a reasonable proportion of the period of limitation unexpired at the
date of their enactment. If one of these two conditions is not
observed, the statute of limitations, by destroying the remedy,
destroys the rights back of the remedy without giving a notice or
opportunity for a hearing. They are consequently void as denying
due process of law, of which they are guilty solely because they
are retroactive.
Another type of retroactive law which has been held invalid as
destroying vested rights previously vested without due process of
law, and which would not deny due process if it were not retroactive is one which approves and validates duties 4 paid under
protest as excessive at the time they were paid. Also, while it is
true that retroactive tax laws65 are not prohibited by the constitution, yet it has been held that an estate tax imposed upon gifts,
made and completely vested beyond recall before the passage of the
tax and not made in contemplation of death, is arbitrary and
amounts to the confiscation of property in violation of due process
of law. 66 These are also laws which are unreasonable and deny
Clark, (1884) 110 U. S. 633, 4 Sup. Ct. 170, 4 Sup. Ct. 312, 28 L. Ed.
279; McGahey v. Va., (1890) 135 U. S. 662, 10 Sup. Ct. 972, 34 L.
Ed. 304; Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, (1913) 230 U. S. 139, 161
162, 33 Sup. Ct. 1033, 57 L. Ed. 1427; United States v. St. Louis,
S. F. and T. Ry. Co., (1926) 270 U. S. 1, 46 Sup. Ct. 182, 70 L. Ed. 435.
64De Lima v. Didwell, (1901) 182 U. S. 1, 199, 200, 21 Sup. Ct. 743,
45 L. Ed. 1041; Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage District.
(1922) 258 U. S. 338, 642 Sup. Ct. 325, 66 L. Ed. 647. But see United
States v. Heinszen, (1907) 206 U. S. 370, 386, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 51 L. Ed.
1098.
65
Lock v. New Orleans, (1867) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 172, 18 L. Ed. 334;
Cahen v. Brewster, (1906) 203 U. S. 543, 27 Sup. Ct. 174, 51 L. Ed. 310;
Billings v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 58
L. Ed. 596; Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, (1916) 240 U. S. 115, 36 Sup.
Ct. 281, 60 L. Ed. 554. See also Milliken v. United States, (1931) 283
U. S. 15, 21, 51 Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. Ed. 809 and cases there cited. Day,
J., said in Kentucky Union v. Kentucky, (1911) 219 U. S. 140, 152, 153,
31 Sup. Ct. 171, 55 L. Ed. 137: "Laws of a retroactive nature, imposing
taxes or providing remedies for their assessment and collection and not
impairing
vested rights, are not forbidden by the federal constitution."
66
Nichols v. Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 542, 543, 47 Sup. Ct.
710, 71 L. Ed. 1184; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., (1929) 278 U. S.
339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. 410; Milliken v. United States, (1931) 283
U. S. 15, 20, 21, 51 Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. Ed. 809. See also Kentucky Union
v. Kentucky, (1911) 219 U. S. 140, p. 152, 153, 31 Sup. Ct. 171, 55 L.
Ed. 137; Road Improvement District v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., (1927)
274 U. S. 188, 191, 192, 47 Sup. Ct. 563, 71 L. Ed. 992.
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notice and hearing solely because they are retroactive. They also
destroy proprietarian interests.
Such has been the development of this principle of AngloAmerican jurisprudence. The objection to retroactive laws, based
on the nature of justice and of law, found its way into the English
common law through Coke who took it from Bracton and gave it
currency and authenticity by creating for it a legal maxim. Bracton, in turn, had taken it from the Corpus Juris where he had
found it stated as a rule of the Roman Law.
The principle in England took the form of a rule of construction. Believing that retroactive laws which affected past acts
disadvantageously were unjust the common law courts declared
that they would not give such a statute in general words a retrospective operation. Parliament, however, could make a statute
specifically retroactive. Thus, the principle illustrates the wellknown conflict between the Cokian doctrine of natural law and the
Blackstonian doctrine of legislative sovereignty.
After the principle had been adopted by American law it went
through a very important development. Although remaining as a
rule of construction, it was expanded in meaning in order to give
a maximum of protection to vested rights, it was metamorphosed
into a rule of the higher law which the courts applied in the limitation of legislative power, and it was finally incorporated into the
constitution of the United States by the construction given to the
ex post facto, contract, and due process of law clauses. By the
doctrines of judicial review and separation of powers American
law provided the institutionalism necessary to transpose this principle, which had always been considered as fundamental, into an
effective transcendental limitation on legislative power.
In giving to proprietarian interests a maximum of protection
the courts expanded the meaning of retroactive laws. The original
common law definition was a law which operated on past acts from
a time prior to passage or on past or pending cases. The development of the principle leaves the term meaning any law which operates on past acts from a time either anterior or subsequent to enactment. Inasmuch as the meaning was expanded in bringing the
principle to the defense of vested rights and its use in that capacity
has received the greater emphasis, today any law which divests
property rights is retroactive and, unless justified by the court as
being reasonable, is invalid.

